



M E R E D I T H  F O S T E R  
Special Meetings and Consent Solicitations:  
How the Written-Consent Right Uniquely Empowers 
Shareholders 
abstract.  Despite a decline in companies’ takeover defenses, provisions barring shareholders 
from acting by written consent remain intact. A key reason that these antitakeover provisions per-
sist rests in the widely held view that giving shareholders the right to act by written consent would 
not increase their power over the company’s management as long as shareholders already have the 
right to call a special meeting. This Note argues that this view is wrong. The written-consent right 
does uniquely empower shareholders. That power results not from what the right allows share-
holders to do but from what it prevents boards from doing without shareholder consent. 
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introduction 
In the early 1980s, the hostile takeover—taking control of a company without 
the approval of its board of directors—emerged as a significant phenomenon in 
corporate governance.
1
 In response to the growing popularity of hostile take-
overs, boards of directors started to adopt increasingly severe takeover defenses.
2
 
Takeover defenses are provisions—generally found in a company’s bylaws or ar-
ticles of incorporation—that make it harder for activist investors and hostile bid-
ders to gain control of a company without board support. A common example is 




Takeover provisions have been a key focus of corporate law scholarship ever 
since.
4
 They drive, for example, a heated debate about how much control share-
holders should have over the affairs of a company relative to the board of direc-
tors. Dozens of academic papers have been published on the topic, discussing 
everything from which defenses have the largest antitakeover effects
5
 to whether 
defenses increase or decrease shareholder wealth.
6
 The debate has also played 
out in the public arena. During the 2000s, shareholders increasingly brought 
 
1. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United 
States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 121 (2001). 
2. John Laide, Major Milestone in Takeover Defenses Likely to Be Achieved This Year, SHARKREPEL-
LENT (Mar. 17, 2005), https://www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/rs_20050316.html [https://
perma.cc/4CNF-RCA7]. 
3. Julian Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 EMORY L.J. 849, 856-59 (2003). 
4. Michael Klausner, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law and Governance: Some Steps Forward and 
Some Steps Not, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 184, 193 (Jef-
frey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (“Takeover defenses have been a third topic 
of intense debate in corporate governance since the 1980s.”); see, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & John 
W. Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2012); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 713 
(2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, 
Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Powerful Anti-
takeover Force]; Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 783 (2009) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?]. 
5. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note 4, at 890-94; John A. Pearce II 
& Richard B. Robinson, Jr., Hostile Takeover Defenses That Maximize Shareholder Wealth, 47 
BUS. HORIZONS 15 (2004). 
6. See, e.g., Sanjeev Bhojraj et al., Takeover Defenses: Entrenchment and Efficiency, 63 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 142, 143 (2017); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? 
The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845, 856-61 (2002); Martin Lipton & 
Theodore Mirvis, Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project Is Wrong, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 23, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23 
/harvards-shareholder-rights-project-is-wrong [https://perma.cc/HY7H-YK4C]. 
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proposals at annual meetings to request that the company remove its takeover 
defenses,
7




Although the debate between shareholders and boards continues to this day, 
shareholders seem to be winning: the most widespread types of takeover de-
fenses from the early 2000s are now present in only a minority of companies’ 
corporate-governance documents. As an illustration, in 2002, 61% of S&P 500 
companies had classified boards, 59% barred shareholders from calling special 
meetings, and 60% had poison pills in force.
9
 In 2018, however, only 11% of S&P 
500 companies had staggered boards (also known as classified boards), 36% 
barred shareholders from calling special meetings, and fewer than 2% had poi-
son pills in force.
10
 
Yet despite this general decline in takeover defenses, one takeover-defense 
provision has remained remarkably resilient. The vast majority of public com-
panies’ articles of incorporation still include a provision barring shareholders 
from acting via written consent.
11
 This provision persists despite the fact that a 
number of companies each year receive shareholder proposals requesting the 
right to act by written consent,
12
 and despite the fact that hostile bidders and 
 
7. See 2012 Proxy Season Review, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (July 20, 2012), https://www
.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/2012_Proxy_Season_Review-7-20-2012.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X78X-VZUQ]; 2013 Proxy Season Review, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (2013), 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2013_Proxy_Season
_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7E3-LQF3]. See generally Lucian Bebchuk et al., Towards the 
Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013) (discussing the progress 
made by Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project toward the declassification of S&P 500 
boards). 
8. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 7, at 162-66. The goal of staggered (or classified) boards is 
to prevent a majority of board members from coming up for election each year at the annual 
meeting. This deters hostile takeovers as it significantly increases the time before a hostile 
acquirer or shareholder activist can replace a majority of the board. A majority of the board is 
required to take actions such as removing a poison pill or approving an acquisition offer. 
Laide, supra note 2. 
9. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., Takeover Defense Trend Analysis: 2002 Year End Snapshot, 
SHARKREPELLENT. SharkRepellent is a subscription-only data feed that includes information 
on approximately 6,000 U.S.-incorporated companies. See infra note 114.  
10. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., Takeover Defense Trend Analysis: Current Snapshot, SHARKREPEL-
LENT. 
11. See id. When I list the companies that give shareholders the right to act by written consent, I 
do not include those companies that require unanimous consent. I chose not to include com-
panies with unanimous consent because in big public companies, unanimous consent is, for 
all practical purposes, impossible. 
12. 2013 Proxy Season Review, supra note 7; 2015 Proxy Season Review, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 
(July 20, 2015), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2015
the yale law journal 128:1706  2019 
1710 




This takeover-defense provision—barring shareholders from acting by writ-
ten consent—is explained in depth below. Essentially, it works by preventing 
shareholders from acting in concert before a company’s annual meeting. For ex-
ample, imagine that an acquirer makes an offer to buy a company, which the 
board refuses against the shareholders’ wishes. As a result, the shareholders 
want to replace the board with new directors that they believe will better repre-
sent their interests. If shareholders do not have the right to act by written con-
sent,
14
 they must wait until the next annual meeting—which may be up to twelve 
months away—before taking such action. In that time, the acquirer may drop its 
bid, hesitant to wait around for an annual meeting in which it is uncertain that 
a majority of the board will be replaced. By contrast, if a target company lacks 
this takeover defense, the bidder could engage in a consent solicitation, allowing 
the bidder to gain control of the target’s board once it obtains consents from 
greater than 50% of the outstanding shares.
15
 
This Note explores why the takeover defense against written consents has 
endured, while most of the other key antitakeover provisions have disappeared. 
The provision has endured in part because of state laws requiring board approval 
 
_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF7N-K7MW]; 2017 Proxy Season Review, 
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (July 17, 2017), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles 
/Publications/SC_Publication_2017_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2V9 
-F8V4]. 
13. See Stephen Taub, The New Tactic That’s Working for Activist Funds, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (June 
27, 2013), http://www.institutionalinvestorsalpha.com/IssueArticle/3223980/Archive-AR 
-Magazine/The-New-Tactic-Thats-Working-for-Activist-Funds.html [https://perma.cc
/4239-Y7VN]; Greg Taxin, Lessons from the Wet Seal Consent Solicitation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 17, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/10/17
/lessons-from-the-wet-seal-consent-solicitation [https://perma.cc/3EQJ-W8HX]. 
14. As a caveat, shareholders also must not have the right to call a special meeting for this to be 
true. See infra Section II.B. 
15. Takeover Law and Practice, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 129 (Mar. 2015), http://www
.wlrk.com/files/2015/TakeoverLawandPracticeGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TH9-ZV4G]. 




 More significantly, however, it has endured because boards have 
persuasively argued that removing it would not benefit shareholders.
17
 
Specifically, boards have argued that shareholders do not need the right to 
act by written consent because most companies already give shareholders the 
right to call a special meeting.
18
 Like the right to act by written consent, the right 
to call a special meeting allows shareholders to act before the regularly scheduled 
annual meeting. Boards thus contend that the right to call a special meeting is 
functionally equivalent to the right to act by written consent. Both rights allow 
shareholders to take various actions including removing and replacing directors 
prior to the annual meeting. Boards have also argued that the special-meeting 




This Note argues that, contrary to this view, there is an important distinction 
between the two rights: while boards can unilaterally place extreme restrictions 
 
16. Under Delaware law, a charter amendment, which is required to give shareholders the right 
to act by written consent, requires both a board and shareholder vote. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
8, § 242 (2018); Scott Hirst, Action by Written Consent: A New Focus for Shareholder Activism, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 5, 2010), https://corpgov.law 
.harvard.edu/2010/07/05/action-by-written-consent-a-new-focus-for-shareholder-activism 
[https://perma.cc/VYN2-6SW7]. 
17. This is the main argument boards make in response to virtually every shareholder proposal 
to gain the right to act by written consent. See, e.g., Shareowner Proposals: Proposal No. 7: Right 
to Act by Written Consent, HONEYWELL (2016), http://investor.honeywell.com/Interactive
/newlookandfeel/4121346/proxy/PDF/honeywell-proxy2016_0109.pdf [https://perma.cc
/YS3V-9PSL] [hereinafter Honeywell Shareholder Proposal] (“Adoption of this proposal is un-
necessary since shareowners already have the ability to call special meetings based on the vote 
of 20% of outstanding shares.”); Quest Diagnostics, Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 64 (Apr. 
10, 2016) (“[T]he stockholders’ existing rights, including the ability to call a special meeting, 
already provide stockholders with the benefits the proponent identifies for action by written 
consent without the serious negative consequences.”); Textron Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 
14A) 51 (Mar. 6, 2018) (stating that the written-consent right “is unnecessary in light of the 
existing ability of Textron’s shareholders to call special meetings of shareholders and our 
shareholders’ right to proxy access”); TimeWarner, Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 15 (Apr. 8, 
2011) (“Stockholder meetings are a better method to raise important matters for consideration 
by stockholders, and holders of 15% of the outstanding Common Stock already have the right 
to request a special meeting of stockholders . . . .”). 
18. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 17. The view that these rights are basically equivalent is re-
flected in the small amount of scholarship on the topic. See, e.g., Matteo Gatti, The Power to 
Decide on Takeovers: Directors or Shareholders, What Difference Does It Make?, 20 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 115-19 (2014); Hirst, supra note 16. 
19. See Eric S. Robinson, Defensive Tactics in Consent Solicitations, 51 BUS. LAW. 677, 681 (1996) 
(“The dissident in a consent solicitation must obtain unrevoked consents from the holders of 
a majority of the outstanding shares rather than a plurality of the shares voted as is the case 
for the election of directors at a meeting.”). 
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on the exercise of the special-meeting right, they cannot do so with the written-
consent right because most changes to that right require shareholder approval.
20
 
Put differently, the written-consent right uniquely empowers shareholders not 
because of what it allows shareholders to do, but because of what it prevents 
boards from doing without their consent. 
While this distinction may seem minor, its consequences are significant. Al-
though the bylaws of most S&P 500 companies in Delaware nominally give 
shareholders the right to call a special meeting, this right is, in reality, extremely 
limited at many of these companies—and, at some companies, virtually nonex-
istent—due to the extreme restrictions that companies’ bylaws place on the 
right.
21
 Consequently, in the fraction of companies that give shareholders both 
rights, the written-consent right is often much more robust than the special-
meeting right. For that reason, even though far fewer companies give sharehold-
ers the right to act by written consent, shareholders use it to gain representation 
on company boards far more often than they use the special-meeting right.
22
 
The right to act by written consent, although used frequently by activists and 
hostile bidders, has gone virtually unexamined in the academic literature.
23
 In 
particular, no published work has identified precisely how the written-consent 
right empowers shareholders relative to the special-meeting right. This Note is 
also the first academic paper to draw attention to the restrictions that boards can 
and do place on shareholders’ right to call a special meeting. 
More importantly, by revealing exactly how the written-consent right 
uniquely empowers shareholders, this Note’s conclusions can help shareholders 
who want to remove such provisions wage a more persuasive fight. In the last 
two decades, shareholders and academics have successfully pressured boards to 
remove or soften existing takeover defenses.
24
 Yet provisions barring sharehold-
ers from acting by written consent endure in the vast majority of companies’ 
 
20. See infra Part III. 
21. See infra Section III.B.1. 
22. See infra Section III.A. 
23. Other than a 1996 article by Eric Robinson, see supra note 19, the only academic articles writ-
ing in any depth about the written-consent right are from the 1980s. See Jesse A. Finkelstein 
& Gregory V. Varallo, Action by Written Consent: A Reply to Messrs. Herzel, Davis and Harris, 42 
BUS. LAW. 1075 (1987); Leo Herzel et al., Consents to Trouble, 42 BUS. LAW. 135 (1986); Daniel 
J. DeFranceschi, Note, Written Consents—A Powerful Tool in Hostile Battles for Corporate Con-
trol, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 967 (1989). Robinson’s 1996 article discusses some of the ways that 
boards can gain more control over a consent solicitation; however, it does not discuss the 
consent right in relation to special meetings. 
24. See sources cited supra notes 7-10. 




 While shareholders have brought proposals to remove this defense in 
the past,
26
 their arguments have generally failed to adequately respond to boards’ 
contentions that the special-meeting right is not only sufficient but also prefera-
ble for shareholders.
27
 Such proposals have failed to receive approval from a ma-
jority of the shareholders.
28
 This Note directly responds to this contention and 
demonstrates that the right to act by written consent does uniquely empower 
shareholders. 
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I discusses the movement against take-
over-defense provisions. It explains that while there has been a drastic decline in 
most takeover-defense provisions, the vast majority of S&P 500 companies still 
bar shareholders from acting by written consent. Part II explores the reasons why 
provisions barring shareholders from acting by written consent have persisted. 
Most importantly, boards have successfully argued that getting rid of this provi-
sion—and giving shareholders the right—would have no benefits for sharehold-
ers who already have the right to call a special meeting. The Part then concludes 
by comparing the two rights, explaining that the significance of many of the pro-
cedural differences between them is overstated. Yet, while these rights can be 
used in similar ways for similar shareholder actions, Part III argues that the writ-
ten-consent right is more empowering to shareholders. Part IV considers the 





25. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
26. See Takeover Law and Practice, supra note 15, at 17. (“Governance activists have been seeking to 
increase the number of companies that may be subject to consent solicitations. 70% of S&P 
500 companies prohibit shareholder action by written consent as of the end of 2014 (or require 
such consent to be unanimous). During 2005-2009, only one Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal 
was reported to have sought to allow or ease the ability of shareholders to act by written con-
sent. From 2010 to 2014, however, there were just over 125 such proposals (just under one-
quarter of which passed).”). 
27. See, e.g., Davita Healthcare Partners, Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 15 (2016); Stockholder Pro-
posal – Right to Act by Written Consent, HP (2018), https://www.hpannualmeeting.com 
/stockholder-proposals [https://perma.cc/R634-HWNL]; Proposal 4: Stockholder Proposal on 
Whether to Allow Stockholders to Act by Written Consent, INTEL (2018), https://iiwisdom.com
/intc-2018/stockholder-proposals [https://perma.cc/TJ7E-PP56]. 
28. See 2013 Proxy Season Review, supra note 7, at 12; 2015 Proxy Season Review, supra note 12, at 9; 
2017 Proxy Season Review, supra note 12, at 14-15. 
29. Finally, while this Note demonstrates that the written-consent right is a more important tool 
for shareholder activism than previously thought, it takes no position on whether activism or 
takeover defenses are good or bad. The issue of whether takeover defenses are beneficial for 
shareholders, and for the world more generally, is complicated and has been the subject of 
various lengthy theoretical and empirical analyses. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH (2012); Bebchuk et al., Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note 4; John C. Coates 
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It important to note that this Note focuses on Delaware law. More than 50% 
of publicly traded companies and more than 60% of Fortune 500 companies are 
incorporated in Delaware.
30
 Therefore, Delaware law remains the most signifi-
cant state law for understanding the legal regimes within which companies op-
erate. Many of the Note’s insights, however, can be applied to companies located 
in other states and to an understanding of takeover defenses and corporate gov-
ernance more generally. 
i .  the backlash against takeover defenses  
This Part reviews the backlash against takeover defenses during the 2000s. 
While takeover defense provisions were pervasive in the early 2000s, many of 
them are now found in only a minority of corporate-governance documents.
31
 
A. Takeover Defenses in the Early 2000s 
When hedge-fund activists emerged as major players in the early 2000s, 
takeover-defense provisions were ubiquitous in corporate-governance docu-
ments. A takeover defense is defined as any provision in a “corporate charter or 
operating policy that makes a takeover” more difficult.
32
 Defenses range from 
mild to severe in intensity.
33
 Some merely make an unwelcome takeover more 
 
IV, Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand?, 54 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 783 (2000); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Stout, supra note 6, at 
845. The conclusions of this Note do not in any way contribute to answering this broader 
normative question. Instead, the goal of this Note is merely to shed light on the significance 
of a particular takeover defense that has long been underestimated. 
30. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 
383, 389 (2003) (discussing how “no state even comes close to Delaware in terms of the num-
ber of incorporations”); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened 
in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Devel-
opments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1403 (2005) (“Nearly sixty percent of the Fortune 500 com-
panies and nearly the same proportion of those listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
are Delaware corporations. In addition, seventy percent of initial public offerings in 2004 on 
the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ were Dela-
ware corporations.”); Division of Corps., About the Division of Corporations, ST. DEL., https://
corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/CDT8-JNZU]. 
31. See FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 9; FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 10. 
32. See Chamu Sundaramurthy, Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Value Implications: A Re-
view and a Contingency Framework, 26 J. MGMT. 1005, 1005 (2000). 
33. Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of Takeover Defenses, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 49, 49 
(Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
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difficult (e.g., barring shareholders from acting by written consent), while oth-
ers, when used in combination, can make a takeover virtually impossible (e.g., a 
poison pill plus a staggered board).
34
 
Boards first adopted many of these defenses in response to a series of hostile 
takeovers in the 1980s and 1990s.
35
 Target company shareholders often favor 
takeovers due to the large premiums over the market price that acquirers are of-
ten willing to pay. Nevertheless, boards at that time successfully argued that 
takeover defenses were in the best interests of shareholders. While takeover de-
fenses made hostile takeovers more difficult, they also helped boards ensure that 
an acquirer was paying top dollar for the target company.
36
 Moreover, boards 
argued that such provisions helped managers avoid “wasting time and corporate 
resources worrying about a hostile takeover” and allowed them to focus on the 
long-term value of the company.
37
 
Two of the most famous provisions adopted by boards of directors were (1) 
the poison pill; and (2) the staggered board. A poison pill can be adopted or 
removed at any time by a company’s board of directors.
38
 If a company does not 
have a poison pill, a potential acquirer may either get approval for an acquisition 
from the board or approach shareholders directly with a tender offer to buy their 
shares.
39
 A poison pill forecloses the latter option by making any acquisition 
“prohibitively expensive or otherwise unattractive to an unwanted acquirer.”
40
 
The hostile acquirer’s only real alternatives, then, are to negotiate directly with 
the current board—which is difficult once an acquirer has gone hostile—or to 
 
34. Bebchuk et al., Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note 4, at 890 (finding that the “safety valve” 
to a poison pill—i.e., that the bidder can replace the board by running a proxy contest—is 
“illusory” when the company has an effective staggered board). 
35. Sundaramurthy, supra note 32, at 1005. 
36. Ruback, supra note 33, at 50. 
37. See id. 
38. See John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific 
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271, 322 (2000) (“A bidder that has won a proxy fight . . . may simply 
remove the pill.”); id. at 322 n.201 (“‘Dead-hand’ pills may be removed only by directors in 
place before a bid begins (or by hand-picked successors), and ‘no-hand’ pills may not be re-
moved at all . . . . But such pills have never gained wide acceptance and are illegal in Dela-
ware.”). 
39. Guide to Acquiring a US Public Company, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (2015), https://www.lw
.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-acquiring-a-us-public-company-for-the-non-us-acquirer 
[https://perma.cc/CQ95-JYE9]. 
40. Minority Investments in Public Companies—Selected Considerations for the Private Investor, 
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Jan. 26, 2011), https://www.omm.com/resources/alerts-and 
-publications/publications/minority-investments-in-public-companies-selected 
-considerations-for-the-private-investor [https://perma.cc/MQ9C-FLAQ]. 
the yale law journal 128:1706  2019 
1716 




To counteract the potential that a hostile acquirer will run a proxy contest 
(that is, solicit the votes of other shareholders in its favor) to replace the current 
board, companies instituted staggered boards to make proxy contests substan-
tially more difficult. Generally, the default in all states is that all directors are up 
for reelection annually.
42
 Companies with staggered boards, however, sort direc-
tors into classes, with only one particular class elected at successive annual meet-
ings.
43
 This means that if a hostile acquirer wants to elect a new slate of directors 
to the board, it must wait two or more years to elect a majority to the board. 
When the staggered board and poison pill are used together, the possibility of a 
hostile takeover is “illusory.”
44
 
By the early 2000s, a majority of S&P 500 companies had at least one of these 
takeover defenses in effect.
45
 In 2002, approximately 60% of S&P 500 companies 
had poison pills in force, and 61.19% had classified boards.
46
 Other widespread 
takeover defenses included (1) barring shareholders from calling a special meet-
ing (present in 59.14% of S&P 500 companies); (2) barring action by written 
consent (present in 73.31% of S&P 500 companies); and (3) preventing directors 
from being removed except for cause (present in 52.16% of S&P 500 compa-
nies).
47
 All of these defenses make it significantly more difficult and time-con-
suming for an activist or hostile acquirer to run a successful proxy contest and 
gain corporate control. 
B. The Current State of Takeover Defenses 
While these takeover defenses were rampant in the early 2000s, today they 




41. See Julian Velasco, Just Do It: An Antidote to the Poison Pill, 52 EMORY L.J. 849, 850 (2003). 
42. Bebchuk et al., Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note 4, at 893. 
43. See id. 
44. Id. at 890. 
45. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 9. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. FactSet Research Sys., Inc., SHARKREPELLENT, http://sharkrepellent.net (last visited Sept. 18, 
2018). 
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had poison pills in force,
49
 35.74% barred shareholders from calling special meet-
ings,
50
 and 25.11% required that directors be removed only for cause.
51
 In other 
words, takeover defenses that were in place in the vast majority of S&P 500 com-
panies fewer than twenty years ago now exist in only a small minority of S&P 
500 companies. 
This change was motivated by a movement in the 2000s in favor of share-
holder empowerment.
52
 At its most basic, shareholder empowerment is the idea 
that shareholders should be given more power relative to the board over the af-
fairs of the company to decide how to maximize long-term value.
53
 A number of 
factors drove this movement. One factor was the slew of corporate-fraud cases 
in the early 2000s, including the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
54
 which led 
shareholders and the public to demand greater accountability from corporate 
management.
55
 Another factor was the rise of new owner intermediaries like 
pension funds and hedge funds, leading institutional and indirect shareholders 
to surpass individual and direct shareholders in corporate ownership.
56
 Because 
of this change in ownership makeup, shareholders not only had greater incen-
tives to monitor corporate management, they were also better equipped to do so. 
This move in favor of shareholder empowerment also had support from ac-
ademia. In the early 2000s, scholars began trying to measure the effects of take-
over defenses on shareholder wealth.
57
 What they found was that “firms with 





52. See Jessica Hall, Poison Pills Drop to Lowest Level in 20 Years, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2010, 5:00 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dealtalk-poisonpills-idUSTRE62T5D320100330 
[https://perma.cc/MJT7-KE9P]. 
53. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 653, 655-56 (2010). 
54. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003); 
In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
55. Noam Noked, Activism and the Move Toward Annual Director Elections, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 15, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/01/15
/activism-and-the-move-toward-annual-director-elections [https://perma.cc/5KSH 
-YQPC]. 
56. Maria Goranova & Lori Verstegen Ryan, Shareholder Empowerment: An Introduction, in SHARE-
HOLDER EMPOWERMENT: A NEW ERA IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 11 (Maria Goranova & 
Lori Verstegen Ryan eds., 2015). 
57. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note 4; Bebchuk et al., What Matters 
in Corporate Governance?, supra note 4; Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 




 and that takeover-defense provisions were associated with lower 
corporate valuations.
59
 They also found that staggered boards were particularly 
negatively associated with shareholder returns.
60
 While the question of whether 
antitakeover provisions are good or bad for shareholders is still up for debate,
61
 
the literature promoting shareholder empowerment significantly shaped atti-
tudes toward takeover defenses outside the academy.
62
 
These factors led to a profound change in corporate governance. Corpora-
tions began to adopt these “best practices” to strengthen shareholders’ rights and 
weaken takeover defenses.
63
 Now “[s]hareholders [exert] more influence than 
ever on how boards and management teams operate”
64
—and companies fre-
quently brag about the quality of their corporate governance based on their rel-
ative scarcity of takeover-defense provisions.
65
 Cisco, for example, writes on the 
investor relations page of its website: “Cisco is committed to shareholder-
friendly corporate governance and the Board of Directors has adopted clear cor-
porate policies that promote excellence in corporate governance.”
66
 Under this 
statement, Cisco lists the takeover defenses it lacks, noting that all directors are 
 
58. See Gompers et al., supra note 57, at 107. 
59. See Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, supra note 4, at 800-11. 
60. See Bebchuk et al., Powerful Antitakeover Force, supra note 4, at 934-35. 
61. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 4, at 193 (“[A]cademics continue to debate the value of takeover 
defenses in law journals and finance journals.”). 
62. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Giving Shareholders a Voice, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 19, 2012, 
2:29 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/19/giving-shareholders-a-voice [https://
perma.cc/Y2LH-TTA5]. 
63. Martin Lipton et al., Wachtell Lipton Offers Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2018, CLS BLUE 
SKY BLOG (Dec. 5, 2017), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/12/05/wachtell-lipton 
-offers-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/86EQ-DJYP]. 
64. Shareholder Engagement: Proactive Shareholder Engagement Can Be a Win-Win. Boards Can 
Help, PWC, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/governance-insights-center/shareholder 
-engagement.html [https://perma.cc/V8PZ-PPY4]. 
65. See Matthew S. Brown, The Ratings Game: Corporate Governance Ratings and Why You Should 
Care, GLOBAL CORP. GOVERNANCE, https://www.globalcorporategovernance.com/n 
_namericas/080_093.htm [https://perma.cc/8V4P-GECC]; see, e.g., Corporate Responsibility, 
VENTAS, https://www.ventasreit.com/corporate-responsibility/corporate-governance 
[https://perma.cc/MSL3-WY2T]; Microsoft Corporation Corporate Governance Fact Sheet, MI-
CROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Investor/corporate-governance/faq-factsheet
.aspx [https://perma.cc/52D5-4U2T]; Summary of Corporate Governance Practices, W. UNION 
(2018), https://www.wuannualmeeting.com/corporate-governance/corporate-governance 
[https://perma.cc/B984-ZQLE]. 
66. Chuck Robbins & Kelly A. Kramer, Corporate Governance: Governance Highlights, CISCO, 
https://investor.cisco.com/investor-relations/governance/Highlights/default.aspx [https://
perma.cc/KT27-D4CG]. 
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up for election annually, that shareholders have the right to call a special meeting 
and to take action by written consent, and that there is no poison pill in effect.
67
 
i i .  the right to act by written consent  
One takeover-defense provision, however, has not faced a similar backlash 
in either the literature or the business world: the provision barring shareholders 
from acting by written consent. This takeover-defense provision persists largely 
because of the widely held view that shareholders who already have the right to 
call a special meeting do not also need the right to act by written consent. As this 
Note will show, that view is wrong. 
A. A Majority of Companies Still Bar Shareholders from Acting by Written 
Consent 
Shareholders who have the right to act by written consent can “strike at any 
time during the year,”
68
 rather than waiting for the next annual meeting to carry 
out particular actions. Almost as soon as a majority of shareholders provide their 
written consent to replacing a majority of the board, that action is effective.
69
 
Giving shareholders the right to act by written consent therefore threatens both 
the incumbent board and its defense policies, including any poison pills. 
In 2002, 73.3% of S&P 500 companies barred action by written consent.
70
 
Today, approximately 70% of S&P 500 companies still bar action by written con-
sent,
71
 and of those incorporated in Delaware, approximately 63% bar it.
72
 This 
is not only true of the companies with the largest market capitalizations; approx-
imately 72.7% of S&P 1500 companies bar shareholders from acting by written 
consent.
73
 In other words, even as companies have shed their takeover defenses, 
a majority of large companies have retained prohibitions on action by written 
consent. 
Why have provisions barring shareholders from acting by written consent 
remained while other defense provisions have disappeared? There are two main 
 
67. Id. 
68. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 677. 
69. Id. at 681. 
70. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 9. 
71. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 10. 
72. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., SHARKREPELLENT, https://sharkrepellent.net (last visited Nov. 13, 
2018). 
73. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 48. 
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reasons: (1) Delaware state law requires both a board and a shareholder vote to 
remove written-consent provisions; and (2) boards of directors have persua-
sively argued that shareholders do not need this right. 
First, in Delaware, if a company bars shareholders from acting via written 
consent, shareholders alone cannot remove that bar.
74
 Instead, they would have 
to amend the company’s articles of incorporation, which requires approval of the 
board of directors.
75
 And as a general matter, boards are in favor of takeover de-
fenses.
76
 By contrast, the right to call a special meeting can be adopted through 
changes to companies’ bylaws,
77
 which do not require board approval.78 
Yet while Delaware law partly accounts for the staying power of this takeover 
defense, it does not tell the whole story. Historically, boards have supported re-
moval of takeover defenses included in articles of incorporation under certain 
circumstances. For example, staggered-board provisions, which also require 
board approval for removal,
79
 were widely eliminated after institutional inves-
tors, the Harvard Shareholder Rights Project, and other industry stakeholders 




The staying power of provisions barring action by written consent thus also 
results from the lack of pressure boards face to give shareholders the right. 




74. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2018) (specifying that written consent can serve in lieu of a 
meeting “unless otherwise provided in the certification of incorporation”); id. § 242 (describ-
ing the procedures required for an amendment of a certificate of incorporation). 
75. Id. § 242. 
76. See Sa-Pyung Sean Shin, Takeover Defenses in the Era of Shareholder Activism 1 (Sing. Mgmt. 
Univ., Working Paper No. 4-2016, 2016), https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=2605&context=soa_research [https://perma.cc/9LP9-WUA8] (“While shareholder 
activists attempt to bring about changes at target firms with their significant ownership and 
specific plans, boards and management often resist activist demands and seek to defend their 
strategies and existing governance mechanisms.”). 
77. In Delaware, a board can grant shareholders the ability to call a special meeting in either the 
company’s bylaws or its charter. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d). 
78. See id. § 109(a). 
79. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 419 
tbl.1 (2005) (using data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center and finding that a 
vast majority of staggered boards are based on firm charters as opposed to bylaws). 
80. See 102 Companies Declassified, SHAREHOLDER RTS. PROJECT (2017), https://www.srp.law 
.harvard.edu/declassifications.shtml [https://perma.cc/W5W6-W2T6]. 
81. See 2017 Proxy Season Review, supra note 12, at 14 (“The number of proposals requesting that 
the company grant shareholders the right to act by written consent has continued to drop 
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verted shareholder attention and a focus on the removal of other takeover de-
fenses like staggered-board provisions partly explain this lack of pressure, it is 
mostly the result of a widely held view that the right does not benefit sharehold-
ers who already have the right to act by special meeting. 
This view is based on the fact that both rights allow shareholders to engage 
in virtually equivalent substantive actions. Generally, if shareholders do not have 
the ability to call a special meeting or act by written consent, they must wait until 
an annual meeting to replace incumbent board members, amend company by-
laws, and take similar actions. The written-consent and special-meeting rights 
both allow shareholders to take these actions—including replacing incumbent 
directors—at any time.
82
 For example, the shareholders of Wet Seal, a women’s 
clothing store, used the written-consent right in 2012 to remove a majority of the 
board.
83
 Having the right to act by written consent was key, as Wet Seal’s annual 
meeting was seven months away and shareholders wanted to act before the 
board appointed a new CEO.
84
 
Boards of directors are the primary proponents of the view that the rights are 
interchangeable, although it is unclear whether they actually believe it.
85
 When 
denying shareholders the right to act by written consent, boards repeatedly cite 
the availability of the special-meeting right. For example, when 3M denied a 
shareholder request for the right to act by written consent, it explained: 
The Company’s amended Bylaws already give stockholders holding at 
least 25 percent of the outstanding common shares the ability to call a 
special meeting. This ability to call a special meeting allows stockholders 
to initiate action without waiting for the Company’s next Annual Meet-









significantly in recent years, primarily because the individuals who were the main proponents 
shifted their attention to proxy access.”). 
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228. 
83. See Taxin, supra note 13; Company Overview of The Wet Seal, LLC, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 
2018, 1:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp
?privcapId=310562251 [https://perma.cc/57J2-V5Q8]. 
84. See Taxin, supra note 13. 
85. See sources cited supra note 17. 
86. 3M Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Mar. 26, 2014). 
87. See, e.g., supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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While boards are the most vocal proponents of this view, key corporate par-
ticipants seem to share it. Many large institutional shareholders, which generally 
oppose takeover defenses, also argue that the written-consent right is unneces-
sary as long as shareholders have the right to call a special meeting. Citing con-
versations with its shareholders, Merck & Company stated that “most of [its] 
largest investors continue to believe that shareholder interests are appropriately 
protected by a well-structured right to call a special meeting.”
88
 This view is also 
reflected in the voting and corporate-governance polices of some of the most 
important institutional shareholders and corporate-governance organizations. 
For example, CalSTRS, one of the largest and most influential pension funds, 
writes in its Corporate Governance Principles: “Shareholders should have the 
right to act by written consent and/or call a special meeting.”89 BlackRock, which 
seeks to “make proxy voting decisions in the manner most likely to protect and 
enhance the economic value of the securities held in client accounts,” likewise 
writes in its 2018 Proxy Voting Guidelines: “[W]e may oppose shareholder pro-
posals requesting the right to act by written consent if the company already pro-
vides a shareholder right to call a special meeting . . . .”
90
 And the Council of In-
stitutional Investors, a nonprofit association of pension funds that seeks to 
promote good corporate governance, recommends that boards of directors give 
shareholders the special-meeting right, but does not provide any recommenda-
tion regarding the written-consent right.
91
 
B. The Procedural Differences Between the Two Rights Are Overstated 
In addition to claiming that the special-meeting right and the written-con-
sent right are virtually duplicative in their substantive protections, boards fur-
ther claim that shareholders should prefer special meetings because they provide 
superior procedural protections. Unlike consent solicitations, boards claim, spe-
cial meetings ensure participation by all shareholders and a forum for debate and 
 
88. Merck & Co., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Apr. 11, 2016). 
89. Corporate Governance Principles, CALSTRS 14 (Nov. 1, 2017) https://www.calstrs.com/sites
/main/files/file-attachments/corporate_governance_principles_1.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BNV3-JP2C] (emphasis added). 
90. Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities, BLACKROCK 1, 16 (Feb. 2018), https://www
.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KDN7-CW6Q]. 
91. See Corporate Governance Policies, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV. 12 (Sept. 15, 2017), https://
www.cii.org/files/policies/09_15_17_corp_gov_policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CMN 
-YCX3]. 
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conversation. This Section explores these procedural differences in detail and ar-
gues that they are not as significant as boards claim. 
To act by written consent, Delaware law requires that a shareholder deliver 
to the company pieces of paper called “consents” that are signed by a sufficient 
number of shareholders setting forth the action they wish to be taken.
92
 Action 
by written consent can occur “without a meeting, without prior notice and with-
out a vote.”
93
 Such a process is generally initiated by a single shareholder or 
group of shareholders who solicit consents from other shareholders regarding a 
specific action. While a consent solicitation can start at any time, “a specific time-
table” determined by state law “applies to the process.”
94
 
Acting by special meeting, on the other hand, requires that a meeting take 
place, that notice be given to all shareholders, and that a shareholder vote occur. 
Generally, to call a special meeting, shareholders must comply with the require-
ments articulated in the company’s bylaws,
95
 after which the place and date of 
the meeting will be set and notice will be provided to all shareholders.
96
 Unless 
the corporation’s bylaws specify otherwise, a shareholder proposal must receive 
a majority vote of those present at the meeting in order to pass.
97
 In contrast, 
action by written consent requires support from a majority of the shares outstand-
ing.98 
Because of these slight procedural differences, boards often claim that the 
right to call a special meeting is not only an adequate replacement for the right 
to act by written consent, but a better one.
99
 They focus in particular on three 
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97. Id. §§ 211, 212, 215(c). 
98. See Levin, supra note 94. 
99. See, e.g., Altaba, Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 39 (Sept. 11, 2017) (“The Board believes 
that stockholders of the Fund are better served by holding stockholder meetings for which all 
stockholders receive notice, and at which all stockholders have an opportunity to consider and 
discuss the proposed actions and vote Shares held by such stockholders.”); Gen. Elec. Co., 
Notice of 2014 Annual Meeting & Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 48 (Mar. 10, 2014) (writing 
that it is the Board’s view that “action at an annual or special meeting supports shareowners’ 
interests more than action by written consent”); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., Proxy Statement 
(Form 14A) 27 (Mar. 19, 2012) (“The Board strongly believes that shareholder democracy can 
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procedural “benefits”: (1) prior notice to the board and shareholders; (2) a dia-
logue between the board and shareholders made possible by the meeting; and 
(3) an opportunity for the board to respond and provide its recommendation. 
Consider PayPal’s response to a shareholder request for the right to act by writ-
ten consent in 2017: 
[Special meetings] offer important protections and advantages that are 
absent from the written consent process: 
The meeting and the stockholder vote take place in a transparent 
manner on a specified date that is publicly announced well in advance, 
giving all interested stockholders a chance to express their views and cast 
their votes; The meeting provides stockholders with a forum for open 
discussion and consideration of the proposed stockholder action; . . . and 
The Board is able to analyze and provide a recommendation with respect 
to actions proposed to be taken at a stockholder meeting.
100
  
While the wording differs, many boards make nearly identical arguments to 
those made by PayPal.
101
 
While these procedural differences between the two rights do exist, their sig-
nificance is highly overstated. First, under federal law, boards and shareholders 
of large public companies generally must receive notice of consent solicitations. 
Insurgents soliciting consents from more than ten shareholders in a public com-
pany must file a consent-solicitation statement on Schedule 14A,
102
 and must file 
preliminary consent-solicitation materials at least ten calendar days before final 
materials are mailed under Rule 14a-6 of the Securities Exchange Act.
103
 Because 
action by written consent requires support from a majority of shares outstand-
ing, a consent solicitation in a large public company will almost always involve 
the solicitation of more than ten shareholders. As a result, shareholders and the 
 
best be assured by shareholder action being taken at an appropriately called annual or special 
meeting of shareholders. Shareholder meetings provide the best opportunity for discussion 
and interaction among the Company’s stakeholders so that all points of view may be consid-
ered prior to a vote.”). 
100. PayPal, Proxy Statement (Form 14A) 64-65 (Apr. 13, 2017). 
101. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 99. 
102. Ethan Klingsberg, Action by Written Consent: A New Focus for Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 5, 2010), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2010/07/05/action-by-written-consent-a-new-focus-for-shareholder-activism [https://
perma.cc/M644-PY4M]; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (2018). 
103. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a). 
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board will have notice in the form of a publicly filed preliminary consent-solici-
tation statement at least ten days in advance. 
The board of directors can also amend a company’s bylaws for even greater 
notice requirements. Under section 213(b) of the General Corporation Law 
of Delaware, a board may adopt a bylaw that establishes its authority to set the 
record date for action by written consent.
104
 As long as the board amends the 
bylaws accordingly, a stockholder planning a consent solicitation must first reach 
out to the board to request that a record date be set, thereby giving the board 
notice and up to twenty days to plan its response.
105
 
Second, the view that special meetings provide a robust forum for dialogue 
between shareholders and boards is very idealistic. Besides a few well-attended 
shareholder meetings,
106
 the attendance at most shareholder meetings is poor.
107
 
IDEXX Laboratories, an S&P 500 company, recently moved to a “virtual” annual 
meeting due to low attendance at its in-person meetings. In justifying the deci-
sion, the General Counsel wrote: “[O]ur annual meetings have been poorly at-
tended. In 2016, fewer than 15 non-employee shareholders attended, and con-
sistent with many of our past years, we received no questions.”
108
 Most 
shareholders instead vote by proxy.
109
 
In fact, acting by written consent instead of at a special meeting may ensure 
more shareholder participation.
110
 Because action by written consent requires 
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107. See Elizabeth Boros, Virtual Shareholder Meetings, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 8, ¶ 7; Brad 
Loncar, Investment Tip: Annual Shareholder Meetings Are Undervalued, LONCARBLOG (June 15, 
2014), http://www.loncarblog.com/brads-blog-annual-meetings [https://perma.cc/XB3F 
-K8BM]. 
108. Letter from Jacqueline L. Studer, Corporate Vice President, Gen. Counsel & Corp. Sec’y, 
IDEXX Labs., Inc., to Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs 1 (Apr. 
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%20response.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9WE-3ZYQ]. 
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support from a majority of outstanding shares, it ensures that an incumbent board 
can only be replaced if a true majority of shareholders support the action. In con-
trast, action by special meeting requires support from a majority of shareholders 
voting at the meeting. A minority of shareholders can thus act if they are the only 
ones to attend the meeting. 
Finally, action by consent solicitation does not foreclose boards and manage-
ment from responding and voicing their concerns. As long as they have notice of 
a consent solicitation, boards and management can reach out to large sharehold-
ers directly to voice their concerns and present their own recommendations.
111
 
In addition, boards can and frequently do respond through countersolicitations 
that express their recommendations.
112
 If shareholders agree with the board po-
sition, they can mail in their consents to the countersolicitation, effectively re-
voking their prior consent.
113
 
In sum, when examining only what the two rights allow shareholders to do, 
the special-meeting and written-consent rights appear very similar. Both allow 
shareholders to take the same type of actions, and the procedural differences be-
tween them are largely overstated. 
i i i .  comparing restrictions on the two rights  
Despite the apparent similarities, upon examining what limitations boards 
can place on each right, the rights start to look different in important ways. And 
contrary to what boards have long claimed, the right to act by written consent is 
the more powerful tool available to shareholders. 
A. Data on the Use of the Special-Meeting and Written-Consent Rights 
The claim that shareholders do not need the written-consent right if they 
have the special-meeting right makes sense only if the rights really are inter-
changeable. However, a review of data on the frequency of the use of these two 
 
at a normal meeting, obtaining an absolute majority of the entire body of shareholders by this 
written procedure is likely to require gathering many more votes than simply securing a mere 
majority of those present at a meeting.”). 
111. See Catherine Bromilow et al., Director Dialogue with Shareholders, CORP. BOARD (May/June 
2014), https://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/directordialoguewithshareholders.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6HQR-CBLY]. 
112. Robinson, supra note 19, at 684. 
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rights to remove and replace incumbent board members casts doubt on the claim 
that the rights are really substitutes. 
Based on a review of the data available from the SharkRepellent database on 
FactSet,
114
 consent solicitations are used as a tactic much more often than special 
meetings in campaigns for board control or representation. The following table 
represents approximate shareholder use of the two tools from 2007 to March 




Corporation Type Shareholder Action Times Used, 
2007-2019 
All Delaware  
Corporations 
Consent Solicitations 47 
Special Meetings 16 
Russell 1000-Listed  
DE Corporations 
Consent Solicitations 8 
Special Meetings 3 
S&P 500-listed  
DE Corporations 
Consent Solicitations 3 
Special Meetings 2 
 
The fact that consent solicitations are used much more than special meetings 
is particularly surprising given that many fewer companies allow shareholders 
to act by written consent. Of S&P 500 companies incorporated in Delaware, 37% 
allow shareholders to act by written consent,
116
 and 56% allow shareholders to 
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chuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 157, 160 n.4 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics 
of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 56 (2012); Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. 
Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 
110 J. FIN. ECON. 627, 632 (2013); Sean J. Griffith & Natalia Reisel, Dead Hand Proxy Puts and 
Shareholder Value, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1052 & n.124 (2017). 
115. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 72. This Note uses the word “approximately” here to 
account for potential inaccuracies or incomplete data on the SharkRepellent database. All data 
within the table were generated using SharkRepellent. 
116. Id. 
the yale law journal 128:1706  2019 
1728 
call a special meeting. Of Russell 1000 companies incorporated in Delaware, 34% 
allow shareholders to act by written consent, while 44% allow shareholders to 
act by special meeting.
117
 
That activist shareholders use consent solicitations more often than special 
meetings to replace incumbent boards indicates that these two rights may not be 
as interchangeable as many claim. This next Section explores why that is. 
B. The Key Difference Between the Special-Meeting and Written-Consent Rights 
The written-consent right is more empowering to shareholders not because 
of what shareholders can do, but because of what directors cannot do. In Dela-
ware, boards of directors can and have put substantial restrictions on sharehold-
ers’ right to call a special meeting without shareholder approval. But boards of 
directors cannot put similar restrictions on shareholders’ right to act by written 
consent without shareholder approval. The significance of this distinction can 
be seen in the bylaws and charters of large Delaware companies as well as the 
previous data on the use of each of the rights. 
1. Restrictions on Special Meetings Imposed by Company Bylaws 
In Delaware, boards can restrict shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting 
by amending a company’s bylaws.
118
 Although by default, only shareholders can 
amend company bylaws, a company’s articles of incorporation may grant direc-
tors the power to amend them as well.
119
 Unsurprisingly, the “vast majority” of 
 
117. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 48. 
118. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2018); see also Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 493 
(Del. Ch.), aff’d, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995) (discussing this restriction). While there has not 
been a court case that addresses the issue directly, there appears to be almost no limit to what 
types of restrictions can be placed on shareholders’ right to call a special meeting. Instead, in 
those cases in which boards have imposed restrictions (even in some cases, after the intention 
to call a special meeting was announced, see, e.g., Dinsmore, 674 A.2d at 487-89), the Delaware 
Chancery Court has had no problem finding them valid. See id. at 496-97. The only limitation 
on a board’s ability to impose restrictions in a company’s bylaws comes from the permissive 
Unocal and Unitrin standard, and the Dinsmore court indicated that under that standard, such 
a bylaw amendment would be invalid only if it precludes a shareholder vote.
 See id. at 495-97 
(discussing Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); and Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)). 
119. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (“In the case of a nonstock corporation, the power to 
adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in its members entitled to vote. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, any corporation may, in its certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, 
amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors or, in the case of a nonstock corporation, upon its 
governing body.”). 
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such articles grant boards this power.
120
 As a result, boards can unilaterally 
amend the bylaws of the vast majority of Delaware companies to restrict share-
holders’ right to call a special meeting.  
While management and boards often publicly flaunt that they give share-
holders this right,
121
 in reality, their bylaws heavily restrict the right by limiting 
(1) when, (2) how, and (3) by whom the right can be exercised. These limitations 
can effectively render calling a special meeting unfeasible.
 
a. Limitations on When a Special Meeting Can Be Called 
Many company bylaws put substantial restrictions on when shareholders can 
call special meetings. These provisions are especially severe when the special 
meeting involves the removal or election of directors. Such provisions effectively 
state that a special meeting that would involve the removal and election of direc-
tors cannot be requested until X days (generally around 30 to 90) after an annual 
meeting and Y days (generally around 90 to 120) before the next annual meet-
ing.
122
 The effect of these provisions is that a special meeting involving board 
control or representation cannot be requested during almost one-half to two-
thirds of the year. 
Biogen’s bylaws provide a representative example. They state that Biogen is 
not required to call a special meeting in response to a valid request from share-
holders if it “contains an identical or substantially similar item . . . to an item 
that was presented at any meeting of stockholders held within thirty (30) days 
prior to” the request.
123
 The election of directors “shall be deemed a ‘Similar 
Item’ with respect to all items of business involving the election or removal of 
directors.”
124
 Because annual meetings almost always involve the election of di-
rectors, the result of this provision is that no special-meeting request that seeks 
 
120. Alex Walsh, Do Shareholders Actually Have “Contracts” with Delaware Corporations?, REG. REV. 
(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/10/24/walsh-shareholders-contracts 
-delaware [https://perma.cc/7SVR-JKAQ]. 
121. See, e.g., infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
122. See e.g., id. at 5; By-Laws, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 4 (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www 
.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/document/jpmc-bylaws-january2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WS5S-P6TR] [hereinafter Chase Bylaws]; Bylaws, VERIZON WIRELESS 4-5 
(Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/Bylaws%20Nov%202016
.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW4K-3Q3K] [hereinafter Verizon Wireless Bylaws]. 
123. Fourth Amended and Restated Bylaws of Biogen Inc., BIOGEN INC. 5 (June 7, 2017), http:// 
investors.biogen.com/static-files/0cd5a2ca-c9a1-4573-b6d0-80813b973adb [https://perma
.cc/95HX-E79F] [hereinafter Biogen Bylaws]. 
124. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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to elect new directors is effective if delivered within 30 days after an annual meet-
ing. Moreover, Biogen’s bylaws also provide that the company shall not be re-
quired to call a special meeting if the request is received within 120 “days prior 
to the first anniversary of the date of the prior year’s annual meeting.”
125
 Taken 
together, these bylaws require that the request be made at least 30 days after the 
prior annual meeting and at least 120 days before the next one. In other words, 
Biogen’s board can refuse to schedule a special meeting in response to a valid 
request involving board elections for almost half of the year. 
Devon Energy Corporation’s bylaws provide an even more extreme example 
of a restriction on when a special meeting can be called. Its bylaws state that “[a] 
Special Meeting Request shall not be valid, and a special meeting requested by 
stockholders shall not be held, if” the special-meeting request is delivered within 
120 days before the next annual meeting.
126
 Moreover, if it involves the “election 
of directors,” such a request will also be held invalid if it is delivered within 120 
days after an annual meeting that involved “the election or removal of directors, 
changing the size of the Board of Directors and the filling of vacancies and/or 
newly created directorships resulting from any increase in the authorized num-
ber of directors.”
127
 In this case, the result is that shareholders cannot request a 
special meeting in order to elect or remove directors during approximately two-
thirds of the year. 
Interestingly, despite these extreme restrictions, Devon Energy publicizes 
the fact that it allows shareholders to call a special meeting as evidence of its pro-
shareholder corporate-governance structure. It has also cited the fact that it gives 
shareholders the special-meeting right to oppose shareholder efforts to gain the 
right to act by written consent. In response to a shareholder proposal requesting 
the right to act by written consent, Devon Energy responded: 
[T]he Board of Directors amended our Certificate of Incorporation to 
add a right permitting stockholders who hold just 25% of the voting 
power of the Company’s outstanding capital stock to call a special meet-
ing of stockholders. Not only is this a positive governance attribute, it 
also obviates the need to permit stockholders action by less than unani-
mous written consent by providing a means for stockholders to raise im-
portant matters outside of the normal annual meeting cycle. The pro-
posal at issue here, however, will not enhance our corporate governance 
 
125. Id. 
126. Bylaws, DEVON ENERGY CORP. 5-6 (Jan. 26, 2016), http://s2.q4cdn.com/462548525/files/doc
_downloads/governance/documents/Bylaws-1-26-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY2R-VJUT] 
[hereinafter Devon Energy Bylaws]. 
127. Id. at 6. 
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in any meaningful way, and the Board of Directors does not believe that 
the proposal is in the best interests of Devon or its stockholders.
128
 
Whether or not these statements were made in good faith, the restrictiveness of 
Devon Energy’s bylaws casts serious doubt on stockholders’ ability to “raise im-




b. Limitations on How a Special Meeting Can Be Called 
In addition to restricting when a special meeting can be called, boards can 
restrict the special-meeting right by requiring a substantial delay between a re-
quest for a special meeting and the meeting’s actual occurrence.
130
 The bylaws 
of many large Delaware companies allow boards to schedule the meeting as 
many as 90 or 120 days after receiving a valid shareholder request.
131
 For exam-
ple, Amgen’s bylaws state that the date shall be fixed by the board of directors, 
but that “the date . . . shall be not more than 90 days after the Secretary’s receipt 
of Special Meeting Request(s) constituting the Requisite Percent made in com-
pliance with this Section 6 and all other applicable sections of these Bylaws.”
132
 
Companies with similar provisions include 3M Company (up to 90 days),
133
 
Devon Energy Corporation (up to 120 days),
134
 and Pfizer (up to 90 days).
135
 
These bylaw provisions substantially diminish the primary benefit of the 
special-meeting right: calling a meeting to act quickly. If we assume that annual 
meetings are on average 182.5 days away, giving a board the option to delay a 
 
128. Devon Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 82 (Apr. 24, 2013). 
129. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
130. These bylaw provisions have been upheld by the Delaware Chancery Court. See Kidsco Inc. v. 
Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483, 486-89, 496-97 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 670 A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995). 
131. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Bylaws, AMGEN INC. 3 (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.amgen.com
/~/media/amgen/full/www-amgen-com/downloads/amgen_inc_bylaws.ashx [https://
perma.cc/4KGT-VA6T] [hereinafter Amgen Bylaws] (90 days); Devon Energy Bylaws, supra 
note 126, at 5-6 (120 days); By-laws, PFIZER 3-4 (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.pfizer.com/files
/investors/corporate_governance/By-Laws_December_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER3Y 
-9HDT] [hereinafter Pfizer Bylaws] (90 days). 
132. See Amgen Bylaws, supra note 131, at 3. 
133. Amended and Restated Bylaws, 3M CO. 2-3 (Nov. 10, 2015), http://s2.q4cdn.com/974527301
/files/doc_downloads/gov_docs/GovDocs2015/Bylaws_11_10_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4UGF-M8DS] [hereinafter 3M Bylaws]. 
134. Devon Energy Bylaws, supra note 126, at 6. 
135. Pfizer Bylaws, supra note 131, at 3-4. 
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special meeting by up to 90 or 120 days would let shareholders act only two to 
three months earlier than would the annual meeting. 
Many company bylaws also impose additional delays on shareholders’ exer-
cise of their special-meeting right through provisions that require extensive dis-
closure before shareholders can submit a valid request for a special meeting.
136
 
For example, the bylaws of Biogen state that in order for shareholders to submit 
valid requests for special meetings, all requesting shareholders must first provide 
information including: the purpose of the meeting, evidence of the stockholder’s 
beneficial ownership, and “a certification that the stockholder satisfies the Net 
Long Beneficial Ownership requirement of these bylaws.”
137
 Depending on how 
large the company is and how diversified share ownership is, satisfying these 
disclosure requirements may be extremely time-consuming. Again, the result is 
that calling a special meeting ends up being only slightly faster than acting at the 
annual meeting. 
c. Limitations on Who Can Call a Special Meeting 
Many Delaware companies’ bylaws also place restrictions on who can call a 
special meeting. First, many Delaware companies require that the request come 
from holders of a certain percentage of the company’s outstanding common 
stock.
138
 Setting a minimum threshold has important benefits. Minimum 
thresholds prevent small shareholders from disrupting the affairs of a company 
by requiring it to hold an expensive and time-consuming meeting on issues that 
have little support from the wider shareholder population. The Model Business 
Corporation Act, for example, sets a default of at least “10% of all the votes enti-
tled to be cast on any issue.”
139
 
However, setting the minimum threshold too high can seriously disad-
vantage shareholder proposals. While some minimum percentage may be nec-
essary to prevent too many special meetings from being called, company bylaws 
frequently require a number substantially in excess of 10%. Around half of the 
Delaware S&P 500 companies that allow shareholders to act by special meet-
ing require that the request come from stockholders representing 20-25% of the 
 
136. See, e.g., Amgen Bylaws, supra note 131, at 2; Biogen Bylaws, supra note 123, at 4-5; Verizon Wire-
less Bylaws, supra note 122, at 9-10. 
137. Biogen Bylaws, supra note 123, at 4-5. 
138. See e.g., 3M Bylaws, supra note 133, at 2 (requiring that shareholders represent at least 25% of 
outstanding voting shares); Biogen Bylaws, supra note 123, at 4 (requiring that shareholders 
represent at least 25% of outstanding common stock); Chase Bylaws, supra note 122, at 1 (re-
quiring that shareholders represent at least 20% of outstanding common stock). 
139. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.02(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 




 This effectively requires shareholders to engage in signif-
icant coordination and communication as well as to comply with bylaw disclo-
sure requirements before they can submit a valid request for a meeting. 
This requirement is made more demanding by the fact that the bylaws of 
many companies impose restrictions on what shareholders can count toward 
that percentage. Some companies require that requesting shareholders hold their 
shares in record name.
141
 However, the vast majority of shareholders—around 
70-80%—hold stock in nominee or “street” name.
142
 As a result, most share-
holders either cannot request a special meeting or must first go through the pro-
cess of becoming the record holder of their stock. Other companies require that 
requesting shareholders must have owned their shares in the company continu-
ously for at least one year,
143
 even though as of December 2016, the average hold-
ing period for stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange was 8.3 months.
144
 
Again, the result is that most shareholders cannot count toward the required 
percentage of shareholders needed to call a special meeting. 
 
140. FactSet Research Sys. Inc., supra note 72. 
141. See e.g., 3M Bylaws, supra note 133, at 2; Chase Bylaws, supra note 122, at 1; Verizon Wireless 
Bylaws, supra note 122, at 4-5. 
142. Marina Petrova, Capital Formation for Internet Companies: Why Facebook Stayed Private for So 
Long and What That Means for Investors, 12 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 305, 325-26 (2012); Jeffrey T. 
Hartlin, The SEC Approves the Elimination of Broker Discretionary Voting in All Director Elections, 
PAUL HASTINGS: STAY CURRENT 1 (Aug. 2009), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default
-source/PDFs/1385.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DXG-8VK8]. As the Financial Industry Regula-
tory Authority (FINRA) has written on street name versus record name: 
[M]ost stocks these days are held in the “street name” of the broker, rather than 
under the name of any particular investor. In that situation, when an investor opens 
an investment account, the stocks he or she buys are registered in the issuer’s books 
as belonging to the brokerage firm. The brokerage firm, in its records, however, 
lists the investor as the actual owner. The broker holds the stock in a “book-entry” 
form, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
This replaces the need for a physical certificate by allowing the broker to keep 
an electronic record of the purchase in its books, which allows for faster trading. 
Investors, meanwhile, retain all the rights and benefits of being a shareholder with-
out the burden of keeping a physical stock certificate safe from loss or theft. 
It’s Your Stock, Just Not in Your Name: Explaining ‘Street Names’, FINRA (Dec. 21, 2015), 
https://www.finra.org/investors/its-your-stock-just-not-your-name-explaining-street 
-names [https://perma.cc/B74X-B3WW]. 
143. See, e.g., Honeywell Shareholder Proposal, supra note 17. 
144. Michael W. Roberge et al., Lengthening the Investment Time Horizon, MFS (July 2017), https://
www.mfs.com/content/en_us/mfs-insights/lengthening-the-investment-time-horizon
.html [https://perma.cc/QRY2-HCXA]. 
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A final limitation on who can call a special meeting relates to how minimum 
stock ownership is calculated for purposes of calling a special meeting. Many 
company bylaws state that in calculating the percentage of stock held by a re-
questing shareholder, a company will look at the shareholder’s net long position 
in the company.
145
 This means that if a shareholder has both a long and a short 
position in a company, then the company will net those positions against each 
other to calculate the percentage of shares that the stockholder represents. The 
result of this position—and likely its purpose—is that it significantly diminishes 
the ability of hedge funds, many of whom hold both long and short positions in 
companies, to call a special meeting.
146
 
d. How These Restrictions Interact with a Poison Pill and Section 13(d) 
of the Williams Act 
These provisions may also have yet another indirect effect on shareholders’ 
ability to call a special meeting. Because calling a special meeting requires mas-
sive coordination among shareholders, shareholders run the risk of triggering 
(1) a poison pill (if the company has one or institutes one in response to news 
that shareholders want to call a special meeting); or (2) section 13(d) of the Wil-
liams Act, which requires strict disclosure from a “group” that owns more than 
5% of a voting class of a company’s equity.
147
 
The poison-pill issue was raised by Valeant and Pershing Square in their hos-
tile-takeover battle with Allergan.
148
 In 2014, in response to a bid from Valeant 
to buy Allergan, Allergan enacted a poison pill.
149
 A shareholder would trigger 
the poison pill if it became a “beneficial owner” of 10% or more of the stock. 
“Beneficial owner” was defined to include “any securities . . . which are Benefi-
cially Owned . . . by any other Person . . . with whom such Person . . . has an 
 
145. See, e.g., Biogen Bylaws, supra note 123, at 4; Chase Bylaws, supra note 122, at 1-2. 
146. See, e.g., All Cap Strategies, GOTHAM FUNDS, https://www.gothamfunds.com/Default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/HRD5-UGUT]. 
147. See Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–5(b)(1) (2018) (“When 
two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or 
disposing of equity securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have 
acquired beneficial ownership, for purposes of sections 13(d) and (g) of the Act.” (emphasis 
added)). 
148. Verified Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Injunctive Relief, PS Fund 1, LLC v. Allergan 
Inc., No. 9760 (Del. Ch. June 12, 2014). 
149. Id. at 3. 
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agreement, arrangement, or understanding to act together for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing of any securities of the Company.”
150
 
To remove the poison pill, Pershing Square, acting with Valeant, tried to call 
a special meeting in order to replace the board of directors.
151
 While Allergan’s 
bylaws technically allowed shareholders to call a special meeting, its bylaws in-
cluded many of the restrictions reviewed above. In particular, the bylaws re-
quired that shareholders owning 25% of the company’s stock “become direct rec-
ord owners of the shares and submit written requests to the Company that 
identify the same underlying purpose for the special meeting [and] reflect the 
same matters to be acted upon at the meeting.”152 
The question that Pershing Square and Valeant faced was whether calling a 
special meeting would necessarily trigger the poison pill.
153
 As they pointed out, 
the special meeting bylaws required coordination among 25% of the company’s 
shareholders; yet the poison pill appeared to be triggered if 10% or more of the 
shareholders had an understanding to act together for the purpose of voting any 
securities of the company.
154
 While Allergan indicated that certain acts implicit 
in calling a special meeting would not trigger the pill, it refused to give Pershing 
Square a clear answer on whether other acts, such as providing assistance to fel-
low shareholders in completing the request, would trigger the poison pill.
155
 Per-




The parties eventually settled in June 2014, with Allergan stipulating that 
certain conduct, including assisting others with the completion of their special-
meeting requests, would not trigger the pill.
157
 As a result, the issue of whether 
various special-meeting requirements that would trigger a poison pill could be 
imposed was never decided by the Delaware Chancery Court. 
In addition to raising concerns about the complicated interaction between 
certain special-meeting requirements and poison pills, the Allergen takeover bat-
tle revealed a second important barrier to shareholders’ exercise of their special-
meeting right. Bylaws may require so much coordination among shareholders 
 
150. Id. at 5. 
151. Id. at 2-3. 
152. Id. at 4. 
153. Id. at 7. 
154. Id. at 4-5. 
155. Id. at 6. 
156. Id. at 7. 
157. Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Regarding Application of Allergan Rights Plan and Dis-
missal Without Prejudice, PS Fund 1, LLC vs. Allergan, Inc., No. 9760 (Del. Ch. June 27, 
2014). 
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that compliance could trigger disclosure obligations under section 13(d) of the 
Williams Act. 
The above concerns make the exercise of the special-meeting right both less 
likely and more expensive. First, they may deter some shareholders from at-
tempting to call a special meeting while a poison pill is in effect or if they have 
not filed a Schedule 13D. Second, they may impose delay and cost on any share-
holder who may have to commence litigation to resolve the questions left open 
by Allergen’s settlement. 
2. Boards’ Inability to Impose Similar Restrictions on Shareholders’ Right to 
Act by Written Consent 
In Delaware, while many boards have, without shareholder approval, put se-
vere restrictions on shareholders’ right to call a special meeting, they have not 
put such restrictions on shareholders’ right to act by written consent. That dif-
ference stems from Delaware statutory and case law that prevents boards from 
exerting the same power over the written-consent right.
158
 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court of Delaware interpreted section 228 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law to require that any modification or elimina-
tion of shareholders’ right to act by written consent must be in a company’s ar-
ticles of incorporation.
159
 It based its decision on the following language in sec-
tion 228(a), which reads: 
Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, any action 
required by this chapter to be taken at any annual or special meeting of 
stockholders of a corporation, or any action which may be taken at any 
annual or special meeting of such stockholders, may be taken without a 
meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if a consent or consents 
in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the holders 
of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number of votes 
that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting at 
which all shares entitled to vote thereon were present and voted and shall 
 
158. Robinson, supra note 19, at 679. 
159. Allen v. Prime Comput., Inc., 540 A.2d 417, 420 (Del. 1988) (holding that “the exercise of the 
right to act immediately by majority written consent may be modified or eliminated only by 
the certificate of incorporation”); see also Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 
1032, 1036 (Del. 1985) (finding that a bylaw “designed to limit the taking of corporate action 
by written shareholder consent” served to “intrude on fundamental stockholder rights”). 
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be delivered to the corporation by delivery to its registered office in this 
State . . . .
160
 
The court held that, because any modification or elimination of the right must 
be in the company’s certificate of incorporation, “bylaws which effectively abro-
gate the exercise of this right” would be invalid.
161
 Whether the modification of 
the right is in the certification of incorporation or the bylaws is important: unlike 
amendments to the bylaws, amendments to the articles of incorporation require 
both shareholder and board approval. Boards thus find it significantly harder to 
amend the articles of incorporation to limit shareholder power. 
The Delaware Supreme Court also stated that, while a bylaw establishing 
“minimal essential provisions for ministerial review” would not be found to have 
abrogated the right, a bylaw that affected the exercise of the right more substan-
tively would be found invalid.
162
 In determining whether a bylaw served merely 
a minimal, essential ministerial purpose, courts were instructed to consider the 
following factors: 
First, a court must determine the purpose sought to be served. A bylaw 
whose real purpose is delay of shareholder action is per se unreasonable. 
Second, the court should consider the impact of the bylaw upon the ef-
fective exercise of the power conferred under § 228. Finally, the bylaw 
should contain only the minimal requisites for a reliable and prompt 




In applying these factors, the Delaware court struck down a bylaw that delayed 
the effectiveness of shareholder action taken by written consent for at least 
twenty days.
164
 Bylaw provisions that would not run afoul of this rule include 
establishing a deadline for delivery of consents and providing that the company 
will appoint a consents inspector.
165
 
Why Delaware statute and case law treats the two rights so differently is 
somewhat unclear. One possibility is that when section 228, giving shareholders 
the right to act by written consent, was added to the General Corporation Law 
 
160. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2018); see Prime Comput., 540 A.2d at 420. 
161. Prime Comput., 540 A.2d at 420. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 418. 
165. See Robinson, supra note 19, at 682-84, 688-89. 
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in 1967, its “broad use in takeover battles was not contemplated.”
166
 Instead, it 
was intended as a less expensive and quieter alternative to shareholder meetings, 




Whatever the reason for the disparate treatment, the practical significance of 
this difference is clear. Many of the companies that give shareholders both rights 
place extreme restrictions on shareholders’ special-meeting right, but do not 
place nearly the same type or degree of restrictions on the consent right.
168
 
Biogen, for example, allows shareholders both to act by written consent and 
to call a special meeting.
169
 But the restrictions on the rights differ immensely. 
Biogen imposes several limitations on shareholders’ exercise of the special-meet-
ing right, including requiring “net long” shareholders to own at least 25% of the 
outstanding common stock to call a special meeting and imposing significant 
timing constraints.
170
 In contrast, Biogen imposes virtually no restrictions on 
shareholders’ exercise of the written-consent right.
171
 Its bylaws provide that the 
board must fix a record date—for determining which shareholders are of record 
for purposes of the consent solicitation—within twenty days of receiving a share-
holder request.
172
 The bylaws also provide that the corporation may appoint an 
 
166. Prime Comput., 540 A.2d at 419. 
167. Leo Herzel et al., supra note 23, at 138 (quoting Grynberg v. Burke, No. 6480, 1981 WL 17034, 
at 6* (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1981)). 
168. See, e.g., Amended and Restated By-Laws, CBRE GROUP, INC. (May 18, 2018), https://phx 
.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTA4NjI2fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF8V
HlwZT0z&t=1 [https://perma.cc/D49N-NUQL]; Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorpo-
ration, CBRE GROUP, INC., https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1138118/000119312516
596024/d169985dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/R5PY-MRCA]; Amended and Restated Bylaws, 
MATTEL INC. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://corporate.mattel.com/about-us/pdf/Mattel-Amended 
-and-Restated-Bylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/MZ3E-APFK]; Restated Certificate of Incorpora-
tion, MATTEL INC., https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/63276/000119312507119676
/dex990.htm [https://perma.cc/46JY-44AY]; Amended and Restated Bylaws, OFFICE DEPOT, 
INC., https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/800240/000119312516666874/d234084dex
31.htm [https://perma.cc/8AJX-BL6P]; Amended and Restated Bylaws, SYSCO CORP., http://
investors.sysco.com/~/media/Files/S/Sysco-IR/documents/corporate-governance
/Amended-and-Restated-Bylaws-20160826.PDF [https://perma.cc/ZDZ4-UY26]. 
169. See Biogen Bylaws, supra note 123, at 4-6, 8-9; Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorpo-
ration, BIOGEN INC. (Mar. 3, 2015), https://investors.biogen.com/static-files/c9eab189-8f30 
-4d7a-902b-e0e51abf91af [https://perma.cc/59J4-U52S]. 
170. Biogen Bylaws, supra note 123, at 4. 
171. Id. at 8-9, 20, 31. 
172. Id. at 8-9. 
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The Coca-Cola Company also gives shareholders both the right to act by 
written consent and the right to call a special meeting.
174
 But while its bylaws 
impose significant restrictions on shareholders’ exercise of their special-meeting 
right, its restrictions on the written-consent right are minimal. The restrictions 
on the special-meeting right include requiring that “net long” shareholders own-
ing at least 25% of the outstanding common stock call a special meeting and re-
quiring substantial disclosure from requesting shareholders.
175
 The only bylaw 
regarding shareholders’ use of the written-consent right, in contrast, is the board 
of director’s ability to set a record date.
176
 A board can set the record date several 
days after it receives notice of a consent solicitation so that “the company [may] 
issue stock into friendly hands” or just “buy some time . . . to consider alterna-
tives.”
177
 Alternatively, the board may set a record date as early as possible “to 
reduce the influence of arbitrageurs, and if the dissident delays in commencing 
its solicitation—increase the disparity between the stockholders who owned 
shares on the record date and the stockholders who own shares at the time of 
solicitation.”
178
 However, while fixing the record date can be an important tool 
for boards of directors in responding to consent solicitations, it is unlikely to do 
much to deter or prevent consent solicitations. 
iv.  takeaways for corporate governance 
This finding has several practical implications. First, shareholders have for 
years submitted proposals requesting that companies give them the right to act 
 
173. Id. at 9. 
174. By-Laws of the Coca-Cola Company, COCA-COLA COMPANY §§ 5(b), 9 (Sept. 2, 2015), https://
www.coca-colacompany.com/investors/by-laws-of-the-coca-cola-company [https://perma
.cc/VG34-L2PB] [hereinafter Coca-Cola Bylaws]; see also Restated Certificate of Incorporation of 
the Coca-Cola Company (Originally Incorporated on September 5, 1919), COCA-COLA COMPANY 
(July 27, 2012), https://www.coca-colacompany.com/investors/restated-certificate-of 
-incorporation-of-the-coca-cola-company-originally-incorporated-on-september-5-1919 
[https://perma.cc/FK2N-4ZAU] (allowing for a director or a director’s corporation to con-
tract with Coca-Cola if the transaction is “authorized, ratified or approved . . . by vote at a 
stockholders’ meeting of the holders of record of a majority of all the outstanding shares of 
the capital stock of the corporation or by writing or writings signed by a majority of such 
shareholders”). 
175. Coca-Cola Bylaws, supra note 174, § 5(b)(i).  
176. Id. § 9. 
177. Robinson, supra note 19, at 680. 
178. Id. at 681. 
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by written consent. Boards have routinely rejected these requests by pointing to 
the already existing right to call a special meeting.
179
 This Note’s conclusion that 
the special-meeting right is not an adequate substitute for the written-consent 
right will help shareholders better respond to this argument. Moreover, if boards 
continue to decline shareholders’ requests, shareholders may be able to either 
pressure boards to remove bylaw provisions that restrict shareholders’ ability to 
call a special meeting or remove them themselves by using their ability to amend 
company bylaws. 
This Note’s findings also bear on the evaluation of corporate-governance 
structures. When judging whether a company has “good corporate governance,” 
the focus is often on what rights shareholders are affirmatively given.
180
 This 
Note shows that looking only at what rights shareholders are given, and not at 
the restrictions placed on those rights, produces an overly optimistic picture of 
how much power shareholders actually have. While a shareholder may nomi-
nally have certain rights—and, as a result, the company may be able to portray 
itself as having a shareholder-friendly corporate governance—the reality may be 
quite different. As illustrated, rights can be severely limited through complicated 
bylaw provisions that boards can adopt unilaterally. For this reason, future an-
alyses of companies’ corporate governance should look more closely at how cer-
tain rights given to shareholders are actually implemented and restricted 
through company bylaws. 
conclusion 
To summarize, the rights to act by written consent and to call a special meet-
ing are very similar in what they allow shareholders to do. This fact may seem 
to support the commonly held view that shareholders that already have the right 
to call a special meeting do not also need the right to act by written consent. But 
looking only at what the two rights allow shareholders to do—and not at what 
restrictions boards can place on those rights—is a mistake. 
Contrary to popular opinion, the right to act by written consent is more em-
powering to shareholders than the right to call a special meeting, because boards 
cannot unilaterally impose the same type of restrictions on the latter as they can 
on the former. A review of the corporate governance documents of large Dela-
ware companies demonstrates the significance of this distinction. Boards have, 
with little oversight or fanfare, significantly restricted shareholders’ exercise of 
their special-meeting right. However, companies have generally not imposed 
similar restrictions on shareholders’ exercise of their written-consent right. 
 
179. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. 
180. Lipton et al., supra note 63. 
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Thus, even though the two rights can be used to accomplish similar actions, the 
written-consent right is used far more frequently than the special-meeting right 
to conduct fights for board control. 
 
